{"id":853,"date":"2010-11-02T19:51:09","date_gmt":"2010-11-03T01:51:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/mixermuse.com\/blog\/?p=853"},"modified":"2019-01-30T09:42:00","modified_gmt":"2019-01-30T16:42:00","slug":"thoughts-while-reading-derridas-work-the-gift-of-death","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/western-philosophy\/thoughts-while-reading-derridas-work-the-gift-of-death\/","title":{"rendered":"Thoughts while reading Derrida&#8217;s work, &#8220;The Gift Of Death&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Disclosure is a showing.\u00a0 In Husserl and Heidegger phenomena is what shows itself without imputing theoria, specific ways of seeing, in an extraneous manner, in a way that changes, covers over or hides the showing.\u00a0 Error is induced by not seeing what shows itself in the phenomena.\u00a0 Thus if science understands space as ether we hide the showing of space as semblance, we re-present phenomena to ourselves with additional, extra-phenomenal appearance.\u00a0 Heidegger wants to think space without imputing his own ideas but by analyzing various ways in which space shows itself such as space as extension (historically abstract), space as lived (experientially), space as sorge (temporal ecstasies).<\/p>\n<p>When Heidegger refers to the thingness of a thing, he wants to ask us what informs us that such and such is a thing.\u00a0 Is \u2018thing\u2019 a word that is self-evident and as such need not be thought further?\u00a0 Heidegger thinks that in the showing of the thingness of a thing something else also shows itself, a history.\u00a0 A \u2018thing\u2019 is really a hermeneutic, an interpretation that shows us more about who we are than what \u2018it\u2019 is.\u00a0 He thinks that there is a long history since the Greeks that mistakes and reduces presence to what really is.\u00a0 So, if we take a \u2018thing\u2019 as simply what is there in its \u2018pure presence\u2019 what we are really mistaking is our own historicality, as uniquely human, for what is showing itself.\u00a0 When we see a thing, the presence of phenomena is taken hold of, pre-understood as neutral, as separate and not a subject; an object.\u00a0 The whole ontology, the historical thinking of being as substance, separate from me, the subject, is already understood in seeing a \u201cthing\u201d.\u00a0 The phenomenality of a \u2018thing\u2019 inseparably brings with it our theoria, our way of seeing as historical beings.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>Hopkins criticizes Heidegger as misunderstanding Husserl because,<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u201cif the \u2018phenomena\u2019 of phenomenology lose their phenomenal status as the \u2018exhibitive manifestation\u2019 of the matter or matters themselves, and are understood, thereby, to be structurally coincident with that which, prior to their phenomenal (reflective) exhibition, manifest themselves as having been \u2018reflexionlos (without reflection).\u2019 This state of affairs can only be understood, from the Husserlian prerogative, in terms of the \u2018ontologizing\u2019 of the transcendental Sinn of the essence of intentionality, which misunderstands Sinn to be equivalent with the pre-transcendental, factically determined exemplars that serve as the phenomenal field for the exhibitive manifestation of transcendental Sinn.\u201d1<\/p>\n<p>Thus Hopkins thinks Heidegger transcendentally reifies Being in order to ground his analysis.2<\/p>\n<p>However, Heidegger might suggest that Hopkins makes the opposite mistake, he takes particular beings as the same \u2018kind\u2019 as beings as a whole.\u00a0 This was the fallacy of Antiphon that Aristotle pointed out.\u00a0 It is a fallacy of equivocation.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>We can look at the argument above as a symmetrical argument that works in either direction?\u00a0 Could both arguments be true but traverse from opposite directions?\u00a0 In my discussion here, <a href=\"http:\/\/mixermuse.com\/blog\/2010\/09\/02\/aristotle-and-modern-sciences\/\">http:\/\/mixermuse.com\/blog\/2010\/09\/02\/aristotle-and-modern-sciences\/<\/a>, I bring up Dr. Brogan\u2019s discussion of Being and beings, Heidegger\u2019s reading of Aristotle, wherein beings show themselves simultaneously as one and many.\u00a0 To take the one, Being, as a universal, immutable, static whole in the tradition of Parmenides or the Ideas of Plato is to assign a priority to the pre-given, apriori.\u00a0 On the other hand, to take transcendental intuition as a phenomenological reduction from facticity is to assign a priority to a particular hermeneutic of ontology.\u00a0 Aristotle wants to think the one and the many, being and beings, as a co-arising, an essential, interdependent dynamic of their isness.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>Values as third person, as rules given, are given precedence by virtue of their neutrality.\u00a0 The neutral is \u201cscientific\u201d, apodictic, impartial, omniscient and thus, modernity\u2019s god. \u00a0The step away from responsibility as he or she, towards the totalization of an \u2018it\u2019, is a step into a transcendental sameness, a valueless objectivity, narcissism \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In Nietzsche\u2019s words \u201cthat the highest values devalue themselves.\u201d<a href=\"3\">[iii]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>Neutrality masks what is by what is not.\u00a0 Neutrality is a forgotten metaphysics in the present.\u00a0 In the present it is submerged but interprets what shows itself.\u00a0 Thus, it gives what we see by what is not seen, viz. the history of metaphysics.\u00a0 Truth as aletheia is inseparable from semblance.\u00a0 As for Hegel, the \u2018not\u2019 is already assumed in any positive idea.\u00a0 The production of perception is made possible by contrast, opposition and separation.\u00a0 Polemos, the god of war, is the Sisyphean perpetuity of Being to wrest truth from semblance.\u00a0 The aristeia of existence is the marriage of triumph and tragedy, the \u2018is\u2019 and not, Being and nothingness.\u00a0 Grace; to hold together the absolute contradiction of existence, the god-man, the call without voice&#8230;the voice of god is the Ethics of other.<\/p>\n<p>1 Burt Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) p. 201.<\/p>\n<p>2 In Praise of Fire: Responsibility, Manifestation, Polemos, Circumspection, Ian Angus, Department of Humanities<\/p>\n<p>Simon Fraser University, Submitted to The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. 4 \u2013 2004. Edited by Burt Hopkins and Steven Crowell. <\/p>\n<p>3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968) p. 9. Translation slightly altered.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Disclosure is a showing.\u00a0 In Husserl and Heidegger phenomena is what shows itself without imputing theoria, specific ways of seeing, in an extraneous manner, in a way that changes, covers over or hides the showing.\u00a0 Error is induced by not seeing what shows itself in the phenomena.\u00a0 Thus if science understands space as ether we [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13],"tags":[238],"class_list":["post-853","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-western-philosophy","tag-heidegger"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/853","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=853"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/853\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3498,"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/853\/revisions\/3498"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=853"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=853"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.mixermuse.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=853"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}